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The EU’s effective multilateralism 
doctrine is hardly a defining 
characteristic of the international system 
of today. While established multilateral 
structures are far from reflective of the 
realities of the twenty-first century, 
multilateral practices remain dominant 
in most parts of the world. 
Multilateralism, however, carries a 
different meaning to different actors. 
Emerging powers have become 
increasingly assertive in promoting their 
own multilateral approach and now set 
the pace in international affairs. The EU 
remains, nonetheless, well-placed to 
respond to this challenge through a 
revision of its multilateral agenda.     
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the Union’s own history and support for 
norm-based multilateral policy-making, 
Member States opted for an effective 
multilateralism doctrine. As a result, the EU has 
spent much of the past decade promoting 
international cooperation underpinned by 
binding rules with universal reach, which are 
created and monitored by multilateral 
institutions. Yet, the reality remains that global 
governance in most policy areas does not 
function in this fashion. Multilateral structures 
originating from the second half of the 
twentieth century provide a platform for states 
to meet and settle their problems, rather than 
functioning as institutions with powers in their 
own right. 
As rule-based multilateralism remains deeply 
entrenched in its DNA, the EU continues to 
have an interest in an international order based 
on strong multilateral institutions. As Alyson 
Bailes puts it, the EU’s ‘deepest interest lies in 
making others – and eventually the world – 
more like itself’.2 Yet, the experience of the 
past 13 years has shown that the EU’s 
unconditional support for strong multilateral 
cooperation across the board holds little 
appeal for most global actors. While the 
fundamental nature of the EU has not 
changed since the ESS of 2003, the context in 
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A European Union Global Strategy 
(EUGS) on Foreign and Security policy is 
finally in the making. Among the key 
deliverables of the strategy is the need to equip 
the EU with an updated vision of the 
international system to be promoted 
proactively in the next 10 to 15 years.1 The 
most recent EU-level strategic reflection on 
what the global order should look like took 
place in the context of the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) of 2003. Back then, inspired by 
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which Europeans now need to reconsider and 
refine their vision of international relations is 
significantly different. Arguably, the most 
important development is represented by the 
rise of a handful of emerging powers in 
economic, political and diplomatic terms and 
their quest for increased influence in regional 
and global governance. Riding the waves of 
their – partial – economic catch-up, emerging 
powers such as China, Brazil, India, Russia and 
South Africa (BRICS) have come to promote 
alternative multilateral strategies inside and 
outside established – and Western-dominated 
– global governance structures.  
In order to navigate more effectively in the 
present multilateral context of changing 
balance of economic and political power, I 
argue that the EUGS needs to upgrade the 
EU’s mere commitment to multilateralism into 
a proactive multilateral agenda.  
A NEW CONTEXT 
As underlined in the strategic assessment 
submitted by the High Representative/Vice-
President Federica Mogherini to the European 
Council in June 2015, the international 
environment has become more complex and 
contested since 2003.3 Indeed, defining the 
contemporary international system is no easy 
task. This is because the world is now 
simultaneously characterised by several 
dynamics – lingering US hegemony (Pax 
Americana), incipient Sino-American 
leadership (G2), absence of hegemon 
(apolarity) mixed with the presence of several 
powers vying for influence (multipolarity), and 
intermittent references to universal values and 
international society (multilateralism). 
Arguably, this patchwork of dynamics in 
contemporary global affairs is largely the result 
of the powerful upswing of several emerging 
powers and the simultaneous decline of the 
West. Notably, the EU28’s share of global 
gross domestic product had dropped from 
 23% in 2003 (in terms of purchasing power 
parity) to just 16.9% by 2015. By the same 
year, the share of China and India, for 
example, had risen from 8.9% and 4.6% in 
2003 to 17.2% and 7.1% respectively.4 Global 
governance structures have, however, largely 
failed to mirror these developments. While 
multilateral bodies have also been plagued by 
repeated calls for a multipolar system, by the 
daunting legacy of flawed policy approaches, 
frequent deadlocks on politically sensitive 
issues, shrinking budgets, and the very limited 
involvement of civil society, these issues have 
all been dwarfed by the criticism provoked by 
legitimacy issues of late. Despite a handful of 
institutional reforms implemented in favour of 
emerging powers in the wake of the 
2008/2009 financial crisis (inclusion of all G20 
members in the Financial Stability Board and 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; 
shifting 6% of voting rights from developed to 
emerging and developing countries in the 
International Monetary Fund), global 
governance structures remain overall 
dominated by the United States, Europe and 
Japan.  
 
In spite of these shortcomings, multilateralism 
as a practice of coordinating national policies 
in groups of three or more states continues to 
be seen as an effective way to resolve global or 
regional challenges in most parts of the world. 
Even Brazil, India and China (despite its 
permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council) that have grown the most 
disenchanted with their disproportionately low 
influence in the multilateral system, have a 
strong interest in effective governance at both 
the regional and global level as also 
substantiated by their increasingly structured 
cooperation in the BRICS format. They all 
cultivate an interest in fostering their own 
development by integrating into the world 
economy and securing beneficial conditions 
for their economic growth model. 
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Yet, multilateralism is more than a practice of 
coordinating the policies of a certain number 
of states. Also important are the principles on 
the basis of which coordination takes place.5 In 
this regard, substantial differences have 
surfaced between the EU and emerging 
powers in several multilateral processes, in 
particular over the past decade.6 The EU’s 
effective multilateralism doctrine essentially 
amounts to a support for legally binding 
commitments applicable to the largest number 
of nations possible, with little appetite for 
granting substantial concessions or privileged 
treatment to emerging and developing 
countries (e.g., climate and trade talks). In 
addition to its preference for majority 
decisions, the Union often proves eager to 
restrain the sovereignty of contracting parties, 
while also linking economic policies to human 
rights considerations and robust environmental 
and social policies (e.g., allocation of 
development aid). By contrast, emerging 
powers and most developing countries appear 
to favour consensus-based decision-making 
that, in turn, results in voluntary clauses and a 
strong emphasis on national sovereignty. They 
also invariably consider their development 
through economic growth to be a priority, 
showing reluctance to subscribe to stringent 
standards of governance or environmental and 
social protection (multilateralism light).7 
While the emerging powers’ inclination to 
multilateralism is certainly a welcome 
development from an EU perspective, the 
guiding principles of their multilateral 
approach have increasingly proved to be a 
source of tension in global governance. In 
short, what is challenged today is not the EU’s 
commitment to multilateralism as a practice, 
but rather the established multilateral 
structures where inter-state cooperation has 
traditionally been carried out, and the EU’s 
interpretation of the very concept of 
multilateralism. I argue that the emerging 
powers’ increasing assertiveness in regional and 
global governance poses a challenge to the 
EU’s effective multilateralism doctrine in two 
fundamental ways: growing prevalence of 
alternative multilateral approaches in 
established international organisations and 
processes; and the rise of new multilateral 
structures centred upon emerging powers. 
THE INTERNAL CHALLENGE 
The past two decades have seen multilateral 
cooperation develop in most parts of the 
world. In the Asia-Pacific and Central Asia, in 
particular, a plethora of regional initiatives have 
emerged with the aim of fostering a form of 
integration (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, Eurasian Economic Union), building 
closer ties between member states on peace 
and security matters (Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation, Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation), and promoting free trade (Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation, Bay of Bengal 
Initiative) or advancing joint development 
strategies (China’s One Belt One Road). Most 
– if not all – of these structures share a 
tendency to function according to the 
multilateralism-light approach depicted above. 
Apart from these region-specific organisations, 
more informal – so called ‘club governance’ – 
arrangements have also sprung up, grouping 
several key emerging powers. In addition to the 
BRICS, the IBSA, BASIC and RIC groups also 
fall into this category.8 These groups have 
facilitated the coordination of emerging 
country positions in multilateral negotiations.  
While most of these initiatives were not 
necessarily intended to challenge or eclipse the 
global governance structures that originate in 
the post-World War II context, they have come 
to serve as a platform for members to 
ameliorate and deepen their relations while also 
developing a joint understanding of topical 
transnational challenges. The impact of this 
increasingly dense set of partially overlapping 
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networks has already proved crucial on several 
occasions, allowing members to block ambitious 
proposals advanced by the EU on the 
international stage. Much of the groundwork of 
what turned out to be the ‘Copenhagen Accord’ 
at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) 
had been, for example, laid at the 2009 APEC 
Summit in Singapore. Furthermore, at the 
annual assembly of the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation in 2013, BRICS nations 
successfully led the way in thwarting EU plans 
to impose a carbon emission tax on flights 
entering its airspace from third countries. 
 
THE EXTERNAL CHALLENGE  
Until recently, emerging powers’ actions in 
multilateral structures were mainly driven by the 
desire to water down or derail robust proposals 
backed by developed countries (especially the 
EU). In the past two years, however, the 
emerging powers have gradually shifted their 
emphasis from passively obstructing to 
proactively shaping the multilateral system 
informed by their own multilateral agenda. The 
most prominent consequence of this shift is the 
rise of parallel multilateral structures, 
demonstrating emerging powers’ dissatisfaction 
with being in the passenger seat of global 
governance. 
The New Development Bank (NDB) and the 
Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) created 
by the BRICS in 2014, as well as the Asian 
Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) 
launched by China last year are the most notable 
examples. It is worth pointing out, however, that 
the formation of such parallel structures per se is 
not unprecedented and nor is it necessarily a 
negative development from the EU’s perspective 
for several reasons. First, the EU had already 
been calling upon emerging powers to assume 
augmented responsibilities in collective problem-
solving for a number of years. Second, regional 
development banks and monetary schemes were 
developed in Latin America (Bank of the South, 
Latin American Reserve Fund), South East 
Asia (Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation), 
the Middle East (Arab Monetary Fund) but 
also in Europe (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, European 
Stability Mechanism). Finally, despite its 
traditional support for the Bretton Woods 
institutions, the EU’s socio-economic model 
combining free market economy with a larger 
role for the state and for civil society actors has 
also often stood as a somewhat light 
counterweight to the neo-liberal model of 
capitalism promoted by the IMF and the 
World Bank – especially prior to the 2008 
financial crisis. Nonetheless, the NDB, the 
CRA and the AIIB differ from these regional 
structures in that not only do they intend to act 
in a complementary fashion to existing 
multilateral structures, but they are also 
motivated by shaping the orthodox policy 
discourse in their respective fields. Moreover, 
in contrast to the initiatives above, these 
institutions are backed by the second largest 
economy in the world, which pursues 
revolutionary changes in global governance as 
a strategic objective.   
Differences between the World Bank and the 
AIIB, for example, are expected to surface 
over governance arrangements and lending 
practices. In sharp contrast to the Washington-
based institution, the AIIB is operating on the 
basis of a non-resident board. While this 
arrangement may serve to cut bureaucracy and 
accelerate lending, it can also be seen as a 
Chinese attempt to limit member states’ 
influence over the daily activities of the bank’s 
resident management. Furthermore, while 
championing sustainable development on 
paper, the new multilateral banks’ prospective 
adherence to robust environmental standards 
is questionable in light of their explicit 
intention to finance projects with significant 
ecological footprint (e.g., coal-fired power 
plants for electricity generation). While it can 
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be argued that the ‘open door policy’ of these 
institutions will allow developed countries to 
join (as of July 2017 in the case of the NDB)  
and shape the banks’ lending practices from the 
inside, their collective voting power will be 
strongly limited in both the AIIB (maximum 
25% of the total) and the NDB (maximum 
20%). 
 
In addition to shaping the development policy 
discourse through the AIIB and NDB, China 
also seeks to grow its footprint in Europe 
through multilateral investment arrangements. 
To that end, the close of 2014 saw the creation 
of an investment fund worth $3 billion for 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). While the 
fund may serve to ease access to funding for 
projects in the 16 countries of the CEE region 
(focusing on infrastructure and energy), some of 
the prospective projects have already raised 
concerns about their potential lack of 
compliance with EU law (e.g., modernisation of 
the Budapest–Belgrade railway). 
 
Finally, the emerging powers’ – and most 
notably China’s – quest for increased influence 
in regional and global governance does not 
consist only in the establishment of new 
multilateral bodies.  Revitalising neglected 
organisations is also part of their strategy. 
Beijing’s intention of reviving the Conference on 
Interaction and Confidence Building Measures 
in Asia (CICA) – a marginal security network 
covering the bulk of Asia but not Japan – during 
its presidency (2014–2016) is, for example, an 
explicit attempt to reduce Asia’s reliance on 
external forces in the security realm, but also to 
respond to the increasing terrorist threat in 
Western China. 
 
MULTILATERAL AGENDA REVISITED 
Neither the ESS of 2003, nor the effective 
multilateralism doctrine are valid reference 
points when the world is faced with the 
increasing fragmentation of its governance 
landscape following the rise of the Global 
South. Rather than promoting robust 
multilateral institutions as a general principle, 
the EUGS could select a handful of priority 
areas where the collective EU interest is most 
closely linked to a strong, rule-based 
multilateral cooperation (e.g., climate change, 
trade, development, cyber security). On that 
basis, the EU could then focus its efforts on 
the reinforcement of existing multilateral 
institutions and mechanisms or even on the 
creation of new institutions in these policy 
domains. 
  
In operating multilaterally in such policy areas, 
however, an embrace of the emerging powers’ 
– notably China’s – quest for increased 
influence in multilateral policy-making 
becomes inevitable. While the much-needed 
overhaul of the multilateral system will not 
happen overnight, the EU is well-placed to act 
on its own and grant increased attention to the 
voices emanating from China, India and the 
similar countries while formulating its own 
policies. The main challenge lies in doing so 
without abandoning the very principles that 
inform the EU’s own approach to multilateral 
policy-making. To that end, the following 
could be done: 
 
Awareness – An up-to-date grasp of group 
dynamics in multilateral negotiations is of the 
essence. In addition to existing groupings, new 
alliances may emerge as a result of the 
establishment of inclusive multilateral 
mechanisms in new policy areas (cyber, space, 
ocean, health etc.). The EU must therefore 
constantly be on the lookout for alternative 
bloc positions and comprehend how they 
interact with the stances of traditional EU 
allies (United States, Australia, Japan). 
   
Reflection – When a key third country remains 
resolute in positioning itself against the EU on 
a particular dossier, the pertinent departments 
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of the European External Action Service and 
Directorates-General of the European 
Commission could jointly reflect on ways of 
transposing elements of successful cooperation 
with other major powers in the same policy area 
into EU relations with the opposing country. 
For example, why has the EU been successful in 
promoting sustainable development in its 
relations with Brazil but not with China and 
India?  
Outreach – Gaining insights into and grasping the 
reasons behind alternative negotiating positions 
of emerging powers is only part of the job. This 
must be followed by a proper outreach. To that 
effect, the EU’s preparation for multilateral talks 
could be restructured in such a way that less 
time is spent on internal pondering and more on 
outreach. In the short term, the EU could 
mobilise its diplomatic presences (including 
those of the Member States) located ‘in country’ 
in an attempt to leverage third country positions 
and even deploy the HR/VP on select 
occasions. In this regard, the Green Diplomacy 
Network (GDN) could be seen as a flagship 
initiative. The network builds on the idea of 
combining the strength of EU and Member 
State delegations in countries like Brazil, China, 
or India so as to jointly influence the position of 
their host nation on environmental issues. In the 
long-term, the EU’s strategic partnerships could 
also come into play and serve as a tool to 
transmit EU values to partner countries with a 
view to clearing a path for cooperation on the 
world stage. 
  
When emerging powers go beyond advancing 
alternative multilateral strategies in established 
multilateral fora and opt for the creation of new 
bodies, the EU will often have an interest in 
ensuring consistency between the functioning of 
old and new structures. In order to maximise 
their influence in and over new multilateral 
bodies, it is critical that EU Member States 
engage in EU-level consultation before making 
unilateral decisions upon membership. If the 
EU has strong competences in the policy areas 
dealt with by newly-created institutions, it may 
also be worth considering whether the Union 
itself could assume representational tasks. It is 
true that new multilateral bodies originating 
from the emerging powers may not necessarily 
allow for the membership of non-state actors 
at their inception. Yet, the mandates of most 
international organisations are not etched in 
stone. Hence, acceding EU Member States 
could try to shape collectively the mandate of 
these evolving structures in line with the 
overall EU interest right from the outset, 
including a joint campaign for a Regional 
Economic Integration Organisation (REIO) 
clause.9 By showing disunity in the face of new 
multilateral initiatives originating from China, 
the BRICS or further afield, the EU risks being 
gradually marginalised in shaping the modus 
operandi of multilateral cooperation. 
WHAT IS NEXT? 
In view of the increasingly successful attempts 
of China and other BRICS countries to play 
the multilateral game on their on terms, EU 
Member States need to come together to 
determine jointly the best course of action in 
response. They do not necessarily have to 
make a choice, however, between the 
continued reform of established structures and 
the embrace of newly-created multilateral 
institutions. A more reasonable point of 
departure seems to be the prioritisation of a 
certain number of policy areas where the EU 
interest is closely intertwined with the 
maintenance of robust, performing and 
representative multilateral institutions and 
mechanisms.  The EU could then throw its full 
support behind reform initiatives that aim to 
render multilateral cooperation more equitable 
in priority areas such as environment, trade 
and development. If granted proportionate 
influence, China, India and the like would 
stand a better chance of bringing their 
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influence to bear on how the world is governed 
in these fields and would thus also be less 
tempted to challenge established multilateral 
processes and norms through parallel structures.  
While adjusting global governance to the realities 
of today is a long and arduous task, the EU is 
well placed to swing into action more swiftly, 
starting with the revision of its multilateral 
agenda. 
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